Left Without a Prayer: Can Antidiscrimination Regulations Protecting Gays Survive? by York, Adam C.
Seventh Circuit Review
Volume 2 | Issue 1 Article 12
9-1-2006
Left Without a Prayer: Can Antidiscrimination
Regulations Protecting Gays Survive?
Adam C. York
IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview
Part of the Law Commons
This First Amendment is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Seventh Circuit Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please
contact dginsberg@kentlaw.iit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Adam C. York, Left Without a Prayer: Can Antidiscrimination Regulations Protecting Gays Survive?, 2 Seventh Circuit Rev. 330 (2006).
Available at: http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol2/iss1/12
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 2, Issue 1                           Fall 2006 
 
 330
LEFT WITHOUT A PRAYER:  
CAN ANTIDISCRIMINATION REGULATIONS 
PROTECTING GAYS SURVIVE? 
 
 
ADAM C. YORK∗ 
 
Cite as: Adam C. York, Left Without a Prayer: Can Antidiscrimination Regulations 
Protecting Gays Survive?, 2 SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV. 330 (2006), at 
http://www.kentlaw.edu/7cr/v2-1/york.pdf. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, the Supreme Court of the 
United States reaffirmed its commitment to protect the First 
Amendment right to freedom of association. Unfortunately, it did so 
by holding that states could not protect gays from discrimination by 
forcing public associations to admit them. In Christian Legal Society v. 
Walker, a panel of the Seventh Circuit applied Dale to invalidate the 
antidiscrimination policy of the Law School at Southern Illinois 
University, as applied to a Christian student group wishing to exclude 
gays. However, the Seventh Circuit did not merely apply Dale; it 
extended it by holding that a school could not even deny official 
recognition to a student group that chose to discriminate against gays.  
This Note will briefly discuss the history of public 
accommodations and antidiscrimination laws, and how such laws 
came into conflict with the First Amendment right to free association. I 
will then examine the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Christian Law 
Society and explain how the Seventh Circuit’s expansion of Dale 
could potentially render invalid nearly all public accommodations and 
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antidiscrimination laws protecting gays, reversing years of progress in 
removing discrimination based on sexual orientation. 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A. Public Accommodations and Antidiscrimination Laws 
After the Civil War, Congress1 and a number of states2 enacted 
statutes outlawing discrimination in places of public accommodation.3 
In response to the Supreme Court’s 1883 invalidation4 of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1875, several states, including Illinois,5 enacted public 
accommodations laws restricting discrimination based on race.6 These 
state laws protected the rights of racial minorities and other groups 
from discrimination in public accommodations until the federal 
government passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964.7 Illinois has since 
                                                 
1 Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335, invalidated by Civil Rights 
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
2 Between 1865 and 1875, Massachusetts, New York, and Kansas, along with 
several Southern states under Northern control, passed public accommodations laws. 
Lisa Gabrielle Lerman & Annette K. Sanderson, Discrimination in Access to Public 
Places: A Survey of State and Federal Public Accommodations Laws, 7 N.Y.U. REV. 
L. & SOC. CHANGE 216, 238-39 (1978).  
3 The 1875 Act banned discrimination on the basis of race in, among other 
places, “inns, public conveyances, . . . theatres, and other places of public 
amusement.” Civil Rights Act of 1875, § 1, 18 Stat. at 336. 
4 The Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not grant 
Congress the power to pass prospective laws enforcing civil rights against 
infringement by non-state actors, and that any legislation passed by Congress 
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment must “necessarily be corrective in character.” 
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 17-18. 
5 Illinois’ current public accommodations and antidiscrimination laws can be 
found at 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 5/1-101 to 5/10-104 (2001). 
6 Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, and Rhode Island passed public accommodations laws 
in 1884 and 1885. MILTON KONVITZ, A CENTURY OF CIVIL RIGHTS 157 (Greenwood 
Press 1983) (1961).  
7 The current federal civil rights laws can be found at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 to 
2000h-6 (2000). 
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broadened the scope of its antidiscrimination laws to protect more 
disadvantaged groups,8 and to provide that protection in a greater 
number of public places.9 
Public and private law schools have instituted antidiscrimination 
policies protecting sexual-orientation since the late 1970s,10 and today, 
nearly every accredited law school in the country has a broad 
antidiscrimination policy.11 Southern Illinois University (“SIU” or the 
“University”) has two such policies: the Affirmative Action/Equal 
Employment Opportunity Policy,12 and a separate policy promulgated 
by the SIU Board of Trustees.13 These two policies will be referred to 
in this Note as the “EEO Policy” and the “Unlawful Discrimination 
Policy,” respectively.  
B. The First Amendment and the Right to Association 
The First Amendment prohibits Congress from passing any law 
“respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech or the right of the 
                                                 
8 For example, women, Vietnam veterans, the elderly, and homosexuals. 775 
ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/1-102. 
9 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/5-101(A) (2001). 
10 Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld, 291 F. Supp. 
2d 269, 280 (D.N.J. 2003), rev’d, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004), rev’d and remanded, 
126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006). 
11 These policies vary from school to school, but typically contain language 
stating the law school’s commitment to a “policy against discrimination based upon 
age, color, handicap or disability, ethnic or national origin, race, religion, religious 
creed, gender (including discrimination taking the form of sexual harassment), 
marital, parental or veteran status, or sexual orientation.” Id.  
12 “It is the policy of Southern Illinois University at Carbondale to provide 
equal employment and education opportunities for all qualified persons without 
regard to race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, disability, status as a disabled 
veteran or a veteran of the Vietnam era, sexual orientation, or marital status.” 
Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter at S. Ill. Univ. Sch. of Law v. Walker, No. 05-4070-
GPM, 2005 WL 1606448, at *2 (S.D. Ill Jul. 5, 2005) 
13 “No student constituency body or recognized student organization shall be 
authorized unless it adheres to all appropriate federal or state laws concerning 
nondiscrimination and equal opportunity.” Id. 
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people peaceably to assemble.”14 Although the First Amendment does 
not explicitly grant a right to associate, the Supreme Court recognized 
that group association “undeniably enhance[s]” the rights to free 
speech, freedom of religion, and free assembly.15 The freedom of an 
individual “to speak, to worship, and to petition the government for 
the redress of grievances could not be vigorously protected from 
interference by the State unless a correlative freedom to engage in 
group effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed.”16 As such, 
the Court has held that the First Amendment implicitly grants the 
freedom “to associate with others in a wide variety of political, social, 
economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.”17  
The Court’s early freedom of association jurisprudence developed 
in cases arising from outwardly expressive groups, like the NAACP 
and political parties.18 For members of minority groups or individuals 
with dissident opinions, the right to freedom of expression was 
enhanced by the ability to gather together with like-minded individuals 
to make their ideas visible to a greater audience.19 Underlying the 
reasoning in these cases was the concern for privacy of association, 
which the Court considered often “indispensable to preservation of 
freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident 
beliefs.”20 For members of political parties, the ability to associate 
                                                 
14
 U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
15 NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958); accord Bd. of 
Dir. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 548 (1987); Roberts v. 
U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984). 
16 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622 (1984); see also NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460-61 (“state 
action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to 
the closest scrutiny”). 
17 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622. 
18 Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm. of Oh., 459 U.S. 87 
(1982) (Socialist Workers Party); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975) 
(Democratic Party); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); NAACP, 357 U.S. 449. 
19 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622. 
20 NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462. 
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with one another free from state interference was essential to the 
party’s ability to successfully promote its political beliefs.21  
In Healy v. James, the Supreme Court held that the right to 
freedom of association extended to student groups on college and 
university campuses because students did not “‘shed their 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the 
schoolhouse gate.’”22 The Court acknowledged that school officials 
could proscribe certain conduct to maintain order on college 
campuses, but that “First Amendment protections should apply with 
[the same] force on college campuses [as] in the community at 
large.”23 In Healy, Central Connecticut State College (“CCSC”) 
students wishing to form a local chapter of Students for a Democratic 
Society (“SDS”) were denied official recognition by the CCSC’s 
president because the national SDS organization had been involved in 
violent demonstrations at other colleges.24 However, the connections 
between the local chapter and the national organization, beyond their 
shared name, was limited; the CCSC chapter proclaimed independence 
from the national organization, and expressed disagreement with 
certain of the national organization’s statements.25 Because the CCSC 
SDS was in violation of no rule issued by the school, the Court held 
that it had been denied official recognition merely on the basis of the 
president’s disagreement with the philosophy of the CCSC SDS.26 So 
long as the viewpoints expressed by CCSC were not aimed at 
“‘inciting or producing imminent lawless action and . . . likely to incite 
or produce such action,’”27 CCSC SDS could not be denied official 
                                                 
21 Brown, 459 U.S. at 91-92. 
22 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. 
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)). 
23 Healy, 408 U.S. at 180. 
24 Id. at 171-72. 
25 Id. at 186-87. 
26 Id. at 187. 
27 Id. at 188 (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)). 
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recognition without also being denied its fundamental First 
Amendment right to associate.28 
After the Court had established that there existed a constitutional 
right to associate for First Amendment purposes, it recognized a 
corresponding right to define the boundaries of that association: that 
freedom of association “plainly presupposes a freedom not to 
associate.”29 For example, in a case involving a conflict between the 
national Democratic Party and a Wisconsin election law requiring 
open primaries,30 the Supreme Court sided with the national party, 
holding that, for the purposes of the national party convention, the 
national party had a First Amendment right to decide the method in 
which its members were selected so they would best promote the 
national party’s message.31 The Court noted that an essential function 
of a political party is to express viewpoints on issues important to its 
members and to make collective decisions concordant with those 
viewpoints.32 The inclusion of persons with viewpoints opposed to 
those of the party’s members could distort this collective decision-
making and substantially interfere with the party’s ability to 
collectively advance its members’ interests.33 Following this 
reasoning, the Court held that the Wisconsin open primaries law 
violated the Democratic Party’s right to exclude certain individuals 
from its political association.34 
The Court realized that the right to exclude, if exercised 
injudiciously, could be used as a tool to perpetuate discrimination, 
since “the very exercise of the freedom to associate by some may 
                                                 
28 Healy, 408 U.S. at 187-88. 
29 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984). 
30 In an “open” party primary, voters may vote for a party’s candidates without 
being members of that party. Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wis. ex rel. La Follette, 
450 U.S. 107, 111-12 (1981). According to the invalidated Wisconsin law, delegates 
at a party’s national convention were required to cast their votes in accordance with 
the outcome of the open primary election. Id. at 112. 
31 Id. at 122. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 125-26. 
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serve to infringe that freedom for others.”35 This language predicted 
the Court’s later decisions in Roberts v. United States Jaycees and 
Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte, where the Court denied 
the United States Jaycees’ and the Rotary Club’s attempts to dress up 
their discrimination against women in First Amendment clothing.36 In 
Roberts, the Court held that the right to expressive association may be 
limited by “regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests, 
unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through 
means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.”37 The 
Court applied this test to the challenged state public accommodations 
statutes in both cases, and twice held that preventing discrimination 
against women was a compelling state interest unrelated to the 
suppression of ideas.38 Before reaching that conclusion, however, the 
Court also noted in both cases that any impairment of the associations’ 
abilities to express their chosen messages by the challenged statutes 
was slight.39 
This check on the scope of the right to expressive association was 
short-lived, however. In 1995, the Court held that a Massachusetts 
public accommodations statute could not compel the organizers of the 
Boston Saint Patrick’s Day parade to allow a gay, lesbian, and bisexual 
group to march in the parade over the organizers’ objections.40 
However, the Court did not analyze Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, 
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston as it had prior expressive 
association cases, primarily because it involved a parade.41 Because a 
                                                 
35 Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, Ala., 417 U.S. 556, 575 (1974). 
36 468 U.S. 609 (1984); 481 U.S. 537 (1987). 
37 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623. 
38 Rotary, 481 U.S. at 549; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628-29. 
39 Admitting women would not require Rotary to abandon its various civil-
service activities. Rotary, 481 U.S. at 548. Any diminution of the Jaycees’ message 
resulting from the admission of women was “attenuated at best.” Roberts, 468 U.S. 
at 627. 
40 Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 
557, 581 (1995). 
41 Id. at 568-70. 
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parade is inherently and quintessentially expressive,42 and each group 
marching expresses a message, the Court reasoned that selection of 
those groups marching in the parade is entitled to the same First 
Amendment protections given to cable operators or newspaper 
editors.43 Thus, the organizers of the Saint Patrick’s Day parade could 
prevent a group from marching if the parade organizers disagreed with 
the message of the group.44 
Five years later, the Court decided Boy Scouts of America v. 
Dale,45 currently the leading case on both the doctrine of expressive 
association, and the use of that doctrine by public groups to 
discriminate against homosexuals. In that case, the Boy Scouts were 
held by the New Jersey Supreme Court to be a place of public 
accommodation and were therefore compelled by New Jersey’s public 
accommodations statute to reinstate James Dale, a scoutmaster whom 
the Scouts had expelled because he was homosexual.46 The Supreme 
Court reversed the decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court and held 
that the New Jersey statute unconstitutionally infringed the expressive 
association rights of the Boy Scouts because the presence of Dale 
within its ranks caused the Scouts to express a message that was 
contrary to the message that the Scouts wished to express, namely, that 
homosexuality is acceptable.47  
Distilling its prior expressive association jurisprudence, the 
Supreme Court articulated a three-element test for expressive 
association claims in Dale: a state action violates a particular group’s 
First Amendment right to expressive association when (1) that group is 
an “expressive association,”48 (2) that group’s ability to advocate 
                                                 
42 Id. at 568-69; see also Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963) 
(A peaceful protest march is “an exercise of [First Amendment] rights in their most 
pristine and classic form.”). 
43 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 570 (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 
622, 636 (1994); Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974)). 
44 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 575. 
45 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
46 Id. at 644-47. 
47 Id. at 653. 
48 Id. at 648. 
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“public or private viewpoints” is significantly impacted by the state 
action at issue,49 and (3) the interest furthered by the state action at 
issue does not justify the burden on the group’s expressive 
association.50 The Court appeared to give credence to the concern it 
voiced in Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, that the freedom of 
association should not be used as a means to uphold invidious 
discrimination,51 when it noted that an expressive association cannot 
“erect a shield against antidiscrimination laws simply by asserting that 
mere acceptance of a member from a particular group would impair its 
message.”52 However, the Court undermined that statement just a few 
lines before making it when it held that it was required to give 
substantial deference to an association’s view of what would impair its 
expression.53 The Court held that the Boy Scouts had sufficiently 
demonstrated that promotion of homosexuality as a “‘legitimate form 
of behavior’” was contrary to the message they wished to express, and 
that retaining Dale as a scoutmaster would force them to express that 
message to the Boy Scouts’ membership as well as the community at 
large.54  
What began as a recognition of the right for small, politically 
unpopular groups to assemble and make their viewpoints heard55 has 
become a means of judicially-enforced discrimination against the 
politically unpopular minority of gay Americans.56 
 
                                                 
49 Id. at 650. 
50 Id. at 658-59. 
51 417 U.S. 556, 575 (1974). 
52 Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 654. 
55 See generally Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm. of Oh., 459 
U.S. 87 (1982); NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
56 See generally Dale, 530 U.S. 640; Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, and 
Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
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II.  CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY V. WALKER57 
A. Factual and Procedural Background 
The Christian Legal Society (“CLS”) is a national organization of 
lawyers and law students dedicated to practicing law in a manner 
consistent with the teachings of the Bible.58 The Christian Legal 
Society has chapters at law schools across the country, including the 
law school at Southern Illinois University at Carbondale (“SIU” or the 
“University”).59 CLS requires members and officers to affirm a 
statement of faith,60 and CLS members must agree to follow a strict 
                                                 
57 453 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2006). 
58 CLS’s mission is “[t]o be the national grassroots network of lawyers and law 
students, associated with others, committed to proclaiming, loving and serving Jesus 
Christ, through all we do and say in the practice of law, and advocating biblical 
conflict reconciliation, legal assistance for the poor and the needy, religious freedom 
and the sanctity of human life.” Christian Legal Society, Vision and Mission, 
http://www.clsnet.org/clsPages/vision.php (last visited Dec. 2, 2006). CLS describes 
its purpose as “[t]ransforming the legal profession for good one heart and mind at a 
time by enlisting lawyers and law students everywhere to faithfully serve Jesus 
Christ in the diligent study and ethical practice of law by ministering to the poor, 
reconciling people in conflict, defending life and protecting the religious liberties of 
all people.” Id. 
59 Christian Legal Society, Law Student Ministry Contact List, 
http://www.clsnet.org/lsmPages/keyContactLst.phpd.  
60 The statement of faith reads as follows: 
Trusting in Jesus Christ as my Savior, I believe in: 
* One God, eternally existent in three persons, Father, Son and 
Holy Spirit. 
* God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth. 
* The Deity of our Lord, Jesus Christ, God’s only Son, conceived 
of the Holy Spirit, born of the virgin Mary; His vicarious 
death for our sins through which we receive eternal life; His 
bodily resurrection and personal return. 
* The presence and power of the Holy Spirit in the work of 
regeneration. 
* The Bible as the inspired Word of God. 
Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter at S. Ill. Univ. Sch. of Law v. Walker, No. 05-4070-
GPM, 2005 WL 1606448, at *1 (S.D. Ill Jul. 5, 2005), available at 
http://www.clsnet.org/clsPages/statement.php.  
10
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interpretation of Christian dogma, which proscribes homosexual 
conduct as immoral.61  
The CLS chapter at SIU62 was recognized as an official student 
organization, and as a result of this recognition, CLS received various 
benefits.63 These benefits included access to the law school’s bulletin 
boards, private meeting space within the law school, access to the law 
school’s website and publications, access to the school’s email lists, 
eligibility for funding through the law school, and the right to use the 
SIU name.64 On March 25, 2005, CLS was notified by the Dean of 
SIU Law School that, because homosexuals were not allowed to be 
members, it was in violation of the EEO Policy and the Unlawful 
Discrimination Policy, and its status as an officially recognized student 
organization was revoked.65  
CLS filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Illinois seeking an injunction restoring its status as an 
officially recognized student organization alleging, inter alia, that 
SIU’s actions had violated CLS’s First Amendment rights to freedom 
of speech and freedom of expressive association.66 The district court 
noted that a school does not run afoul of the First Amendment when it 
denies official recognition to a student group “that reserves the right to 
violate any valid campus rules with which it disagrees,”67 and found 
the EEO Policy to be facially neutral and otherwise valid.68 Because of 
the early stage of the case, the court could not yet determine whether 
the EEO Policy had been applied neutrally to CLS.69 As such, the 
district court denied CLS’s motion for a preliminary injunction, 
finding that CLS had failed to demonstrate the necessary likelihood of 
                                                 
61 Christian Legal Soc’y, 2005 WL 1606448, at *1. 
62 For the remainder of this Note, “CLS” will refer to the SIU chapter. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at *2. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. (citing Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 193-94 (1972)). 
68 Christian Legal Soc’y, 2005 WL 1606448, at *2. 
69 Id. at *2 n.2. 
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success on its First Amendment claims, calling it, “at best … a close 
question.”70 CLS appealed and filed a motion for an injunction 
pending appeal, which was granted by the seventh circuit.71 
B. The Seventh Circuit Decision 
A divided panel of the seventh circuit reversed the district court’s 
denial of CLS’s motion for a preliminary injunction and remanded the 
case to the district court with direction to enter a preliminary 
injunction on behalf of CLS.72 Writing for the majority, Judge Sykes, 
joined by Judge Kanne, held that CLS had demonstrated a likelihood 
of success on the merits of both of its First Amendment claims: 
expressive association and the denial of access to a public forum.73 
Judge Wood, in dissent, argued that CLS had not met its burden of 
proof and that the record was too incomplete to hold that the district 
court’s findings were an abuse of discretion.74 
The majority first questioned whether the district court was 
correct in finding that CLS had, in fact, violated any stated SIU 
policy.75 There was no indication in the record or on oral argument that 
CLS had violated any state or federal antidiscrimination laws, so CLS 
could not have violated the Unlawful Discrimination Policy.76 The 
majority also questioned whether the EEO Policy applied to CLS, as 
CLS did not employ anyone, nor was CLS a “mouthpiece[]” of SIU.77 
Judge Wood responded in her dissent that the EEO Policy applied to 
CLS because it requires that the University grant all “educational 
opportunities” without discrimination.78 Because participation in 
student organizations can be central to the educational experience in 
                                                 
70 Id. at *3. 
71 Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 859 (2006). 
72 Id. at 867. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 876 (Wood, J. dissenting). 
75 Id. at 860. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 860-61. 
78 Id. at 872 (Wood, J. dissenting). 
12
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universities,79 SIU would have to provide equal access to all student 
organizations to give effect to the EEO Policy.80 Regardless, the 
majority doubted that CLS had violated the EEO Policy because CLS 
did not discriminate based on sexual orientation, but rather excluded 
individuals from membership based upon their “belief and behavior.”81 
This argument was moot, according to the dissent, since the record 
was silent regarding whether CLS had ever admitted as a member an 
individual who had repented past homosexual behavior.82 Further, 
given the liberty interest in private sexual autonomy recognized by the 
Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas,83 Judge Wood argued that SIU 
could validly interpret the EEO Policy to apply to discrimination based 
on homosexual conduct as well as status.84 
Next, the court addressed CLS’s expressive association claim. 
Relying heavily on Dale, Roberts, and Healy, the majority concluded 
that SIU’s application of the EEO Policy forced CLS to accept 
homosexuals as members, and therefore significantly affected CLS’s 
ability to express its viewpoint that homosexuality is immoral.85 The 
dissent disagreed, arguing that SIU merely decided to withdraw certain 
benefits from CLS because CLS was not in compliance with the EEO 
Policy.86 
The court then determined that SIU had violated CLS’s free 
speech right by revoking CLS’s right to enter a public forum it was 
                                                 
79 See Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 222-23 
(2000); Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 824 (1995). 
80 Christian Legal Soc’y, 453 F.3d at 873 (Wood, J. dissenting). 
81 Id. at 860. According to CLS, a person who was homosexual, but repented 
past homosexual conduct and agreed not to engage in homosexual conduct in the 
future, could be admitted as a member. Id. at 858. 
82 Id. at 873 (Wood, J. dissenting). 
83 539 U.S. 558 (2003). The Supreme Court, holding invalid a Texas statute 
criminalizing homosexual sodomy, noted that homosexual couples have the same 
autonomy to choose private, intimate relationships as do heterosexual couples. Id. at 
574. 
84 Christian Legal Soc’y, 453 F.3d at 873 (Wood, J. dissenting). 
85 Id. at 863. 
86 Id. at 873-74 (Wood, J. dissenting). 
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entitled to access.87 Although the record was too incomplete88 to 
address the proper level of scrutiny89 under which to evaluate the 
forum created by SIU, the majority nonetheless concluded that under 
any level of scrutiny, SIU had violated CLS’s free speech rights 
because it had applied the EEO Policy to CLS in a viewpoint-
discriminatory fashion.90 The dissent reasoned that if the record was 
insufficiently developed to decide on the level of scrutiny, it was 
likewise insufficiently developed to determine that SIU had unfairly 
applied the EEO Policy.91 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A. The Seventh Circuit misapplied the Supreme Court’s expressive 
association jurisprudence, extending First Amendment protection 
beyond the sorts of activities typically covered 
In reaching its decision regarding CLS’s expressive association 
claim, the majority relied extensively on the Supreme Court’s 
expressive association cases, specifically Dale, Hurley, Roberts, and 
Healy.92 However, the cases relied upon by the majority are 
distinguishable in three important respects: first, CLS was not 
compelled to associate with anyone, nor was CLS forced to modify the 
content of its expression; second, SIU did not prevent CLS from 
associating on or around the SIU campus; and finally, SIU has a 
compelling interest in eliminating invidious discrimination within its 
educational community. Based on the first two facts, the Seventh 
Circuit should have held that SIU’s enforcement of the EEO Policy did 
not significantly impair CLS’s associational rights. The third fact 
                                                 
87 Id. at 867. 
88 Id. 
89 See generally Good News Club v. Milford Central Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106-
107 (2001); Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829-30 (1995); Perry Educ. 
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983), for discussions of 
the levels of scrutiny afforded to differing public fora. 
90 Christian Legal Soc’y, 453 F.3d at 866-67. 
91 Id. at 874-75 (Wood, J. dissenting). 
92 Id. at 861-64. 
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should have led the Seventh Circuit to the conclusion that any 
violation of CLS’s associational rights was justified. The majority’s 
misapplication of the Supreme Court’s expressive association 
jurisprudence overextended the protections properly granted to 
expressive associations to the potential detriment of all state 
antidiscrimination policies.93 
1. CLS’s claim was distinguishable from prior expressive 
association cases because CLS was not compelled to admit 
anyone as a member. 
To succeed in an expressive association claim, a group must first 
show that it is expressive association.94 The group must then 
demonstrate that its “ability to advocate public or private viewpoints” 
has been significantly impacted by government action.95 In Roberts, 
the Supreme Court recognized that “forc[ing] [a] group to accept 
members it does not desire” may violate the group’s associational 
freedom because it significantly interferes with the internal structure 
and affairs of the group.96 Although the Jaycees were forced to include 
women by the public accommodations statute at issue in Roberts, the 
Supreme Court nonetheless held the statute to be valid because the 
state’s interest in ending discrimination against women was 
important,97 and the Jaycees’ associational freedoms were not 
significantly impaired.98 The Supreme Court’s subsequent expressive 
association decisions also involved compelled association: the Boy 
Scouts were required under a New Jersey public accommodations law 
to reinstate Mr. Dale as an assistant scoutmaster,99 and the organizers 
                                                 
93 For an examination of recent developments in the expressive association 
doctrine as contrary to antidiscrimination laws, see Jed Rubenfeld, Essay, The Anti-
Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141, 1156-1163 (2002). 
94 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000). SIU did not contest 
CLS’s status as an expressive association. Christian Legal Soc’y, 453 F.3d at 862. 
95 Dale, 530 U.S. at 650. 
96 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984). 
97 Id. at 625. 
98 Id. at 627. 
99 Dale, 530 U.S. at 646.  
15
York: Left Without a Prayer: Can Antidiscrimination Regulations Protect
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2006
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 2, Issue 1                           Fall 2006 
 
 345
of Boston’s St. Patrick’s Day Parade were forced to allow a group of 
gay and lesbian individuals to march in their parade.100 In a recent case 
addressing an expressive association claim, the Court held there was 
no violation of expressive association rights caused by granting 
military recruiters mandatory access to a law school campus because 
military recruiters did not “become members of the school’s 
expressive association.”101 
Nowhere in its complaint did CLS allege that it had been 
compelled by SIU to admit anyone,102 and the district court found no 
such compulsion.103 Although the majority acknowledged that there 
was no actual compulsion, it held SIU’s withdrawal of recognition was 
constitutionally equivalent to a compelled association, and therefore 
violated CLS’s expressive association rights.104 The majority relied on 
Healy to reach the conclusion that SIU could not use the threat of 
derecognition to force CLS to accept openly gay students as members 
and officers.105 However, the majority’s reliance on Healy for this 
proposition was puzzling, as the facts in Healy did not involve a 
student association compelled to admit members, but rather a student 
association prevented from associating at all.106  
While the majority correctly noted that First Amendment rights 
are protected from indirect as well as direct interference,107 a state may 
make certain value judgments and implement those judgments through 
                                                 
100 Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 
557, 563-64 (1995). 
101 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 
1297, 1312 (2006). 
102 Verified Complaint, Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter at S. Ill. Univ. Sch. of 
Law v. Walker, 2005 WL 1606448 (S.D. Ill. Jul. 5, 2005) (No. 05-4070-GPM). 
103 Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter at S. Ill. Univ. Sch. of Law v. Walker, No. 
05-4070-GPM, 2005 WL 1606448, at *2 (S.D. Ill Jul. 5, 2005). 
104 Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 864 (2006). 
105 Id. 
106 Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 176 (1972). 
107 Christian Legal Soc’y, 453 F.3d at 864 (citing Healy, 408 U.S. at 183). 
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the allocation of public resources.108 In addition, the Supreme Court 
has repeatedly held that Congress may attach conditions to the receipt 
of federal funds, even when those conditions intrude upon the exercise 
of certain fundamental rights.109 Although a state may not withhold a 
benefit to compel individuals to forgo First Amendment rights, a state 
may, within broad limits, appropriate public funds to establish a 
program and then define the limits of that program.110  
SIU created a program of recognized student organizations, and 
established criteria, including meeting the EEO Policy, for becoming a 
recognized student organization.111 Because CLS refused to admit 
homosexuals as members, SIU informed CLS that it had violated the 
EEO Policy, and CLS was therefore no longer allowed to participate in 
the program of recognized student organizations.112 The majority 
asked what purpose was served by “forcing CLS to accept members 
whose activities violate its creed other than eradicating or neutralizing 
particular beliefs contained in that creed.”113 However, nowhere in the 
record before the Seventh Circuit was there any indication that SIU 
                                                 
108 Cf. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977) (holding that, despite a 
woman’s fundamental right to choose to terminate a pregnancy, Connecticut is under 
no obligation to use public funds to subsidize abortions for indigent women).  
109 See United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194 (2003) 
(plurality) (mandated use of Internet filters on library computers where Internet 
access was procured with federal assistance did not violate library patrons’ First 
Amendment rights); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (prevention of family-
planning funds from being used by programs mentioning abortion did not violate 
either free speech rights of doctors or patients’ rights to choose to terminate 
pregnancy); Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 575-76 (1984) (forbidding a 
college receiving federal funding from discriminating on the basis of gender did not 
violate that college’s First Amendment rights); see also Rumsfeld v. Forum for 
Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1306-07 (2006) (although 
the Court held that Congress could directly compel law schools to accept military 
recruiters, it noted that the law schools were “free to decline the federal funds”). 
110 Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 210-11. 
111 Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 4, Christian Legal Soc’y, 453 F.3d 853 
(No. 05-3239). 
112 Christian Legal Soc’y, 453 F.3d at 858. 
113 Id. at 863. 
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created the EEO Policy to force student groups like CLS to include 
members with which those groups did not wish to associate. Like 
virtually all law schools across the country,114 SIU had a preexisting 
antidiscrimination policy, generally applied, that precluded 
discrimination on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, national 
origin, age, disability, . . . sexual orientation, or marital status,”115 and 
required that all recognized student groups comply with that policy.116 
SIU found that CLS was in violation of this policy and revoked its 
recognized status.  
Because SIU did not force CLS to admit anyone, the majority’s 
reliance on Dale and Hurley is misplaced. Rather, as in Rumsfeld v. 
Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, CLS “has attempted to 
stretch [the] . . . First Amendment doctrine[]” of expressive association 
“well beyond the sort of activities” protected by that doctrine,117 and 
the majority should not have extended First Amendment protection to 
CLS. Because Dale significantly weakened a state’s ability to enforce 
antidiscrimination laws against certain groups, courts should be wary 
of extending the holding of Dale.118 By shielding CLS from the 
enforcement of SIU’s EEO Policy despite the fact that CLS wished to 
avail itself of the benefits attendant to official recognition by SIU, the 
majority of the panel did just that. This overextension of Dale could 
potentially lead to the invalidation of any antidiscrimination policy 
protecting homosexuals, and it calls into question the validity of 
antidiscrimination policies generally. 
                                                 
114 Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld, 291 F. 
Supp. 2d 269, 280 (D.N.J. 2003), rev’d, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004), rev’d and 
remanded, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006). 
115 Christian Legal Soc’y, 453 F.3d at 858. 
116 Brief of Defendants-Appellees, supra note 111, at 4. 
117 126 S. Ct. at 1313. 
118 Cf. Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 767, 
810 n.96 (2001) (taken to its logical conclusion, the holding in Dale could allow a 
Christian homeowners’ association, wishing to exclude African-Americans, Jews, 
homosexuals, or anyone else on the basis of religious belief, to demand that any law 
challenging their discrimination be subjected to strict scrutiny). 
18
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 12
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol2/iss1/12
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 2, Issue 1                           Fall 2006 
 
 348
2. Although SIU withdrew from CLS the benefits conferred to 
officially recognized student groups, SIU did not prevent CLS 
from associating on or around the SIU campus. 
The majority argued that the facts before it were similar to the 
facts in Healy in “all material respects.”119 However, the facts in Healy 
are readily distinguishable, as Judge Wood noted in her dissent.120 Not 
only did the president of the college in Healy refuse to confer 
recognized status to the student group (“SDS”) in that case, he denied 
SDS the ability to meet on campus and took the “extraordinary step of 
refusing to let students meet (i.e. sit together) in the campus coffee 
shop!”121 SIU did nothing so drastic to CLS. CLS was still able to 
meet on campus, and, as recognized by the district court, its abilities to 
“assemble, evangelize, and proselytize [were] not impaired.”122 
Although CLS’s access to physical bulletin-board space at SIU was 
restricted when it was derecognized, CLS was still free to distribute 
flyers on campus.123 In addition, as recognized by the dissent, the 
importance of physical bulletin-board space on modern campuses has 
diminished markedly in the years since Healy was decided: “[m]ost 
universities and colleges, and most college-aged students, 
communicate through email, websites, and hosts like MySpace®.”124 
All of these avenues remained available to CLS, so CLS had 
substantial means to get its message out to the SIU community,125 
unlike the students in Healy. 
Not only are the facts in Healy materially distinguishable from 
this case, the majority overlooked an important holding in Healy. The 
Healy Court held that SDS’s associational rights were violated when 
the college refused, without justification, to grant it official 
                                                 
119 Christian Legal Soc’y, 453 F.3d at 864. 
120 Id. at 874 (Wood, J. dissenting). 
121 Id. (citing Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181 (1972)). 
122 Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter at S. Ill. Univ. Sch. of Law v. Walker, No. 
05-4070-GPM, 2005 WL 1606448, at *2 (S.D. Ill Jul. 5, 2005). 
123 Brief of Defendants-Appellees, supra note 111, at 11. 
124 Christian Legal Soc’y, 453 F.3d at 874 (Wood, J. dissenting). 
125 Id. 
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recognition.126 The Court further held that “the benefits of 
participation in the internal life of the college community may be 
denied to any group that reserves the right to violate any valid campus 
rules with which it disagrees.”127 This is directly analogous to the case 
before the Seventh Circuit: CLS sought “the benefits of participation” 
as a recognized student group at SIU, but also wished to violate SIU’s 
EEO Policy. Under the correct interpretation of Healy, SIU had every 
right to derecognize CLS. The majority recognized SIU’s “interest in 
maintaining order and enforcing reasonable campus rules,” but stated 
that SIU could not apply the EEO Policy to CLS because it was aimed 
at CLS’s “advocacy or philosophy.”128 Although CLS alleged that SIU 
had singled it out for enforcement of the EEO Policy,129 the record 
before the Seventh Circuit was undeveloped. As noted in the dissent, 
SIU had not yet submitted any evidence to counter CLS’s assertion 
that the EEO Policy had been applied to it unfairly.130 Yet, the majority 
nevertheless held that SIU had no purpose in enforcing its 
antidiscrimination policy other than “neutralizing particular beliefs” of 
CLS.131 As addressed in greater detail below, SIU’s purpose in 
enforcing its EEO Policy was not to disadvantage CLS, but to further 
the compelling goal of eliminating discrimination within student 
organizations.  
3. SIU has a compelling interest in eliminating invidious 
discrimination within its educational community. 
The final element of the Supreme Court’s expressive association 
test is the balancing of interests.132 Even if a group shows that a 
regulation has significantly impaired its ability to associate, the 
regulation may still be valid if it “serve[s] compelling state interests, 
                                                 
126 408 U.S. at 181. 
127 Id. at 193-94. 
128 Christian Legal Soc’y, 453 F.3d at 864. 
129 Verified Complaint, supra note 102, at ¶ 4.11. 
130 Christian Legal Soc’y, 453 F.3d at 869 (Wood, J. dissenting). 
131 Id. at 863. 
132 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 658-59 (2000). 
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unrelated to the suppression of ideas,” and is narrowly-tailored to meet 
those interests.133 Not only did SIU not significantly impair CLS’s 
ability to associate, the majority misapplied the balancing test by 
declining to recognize SIU’s compelling interest in eliminating 
discrimination in the educational opportunities provided to students. In 
Roberts, the Supreme Court held that Minnesota’s antidiscrimination 
law “clearly further[ed] compelling state interests” by ensuring equal 
access to women,134 and that a state’s interest in ensuring equal access 
to all of its citizens was unrelated to the suppression of ideas.135  
Most law schools have, since at least 1990, advanced 
antidiscrimination policies identifying sexual orientation as a protected 
class.136 These policies arose, at least in part, as a response to the 
discrimination to which gay people in America have been subjected.137 
In addition, the Supreme Court has long held elimination of 
discrimination in education to be a compelling interest.138 More 
recently, the Supreme Court has recognized that diversity among a law 
school’s student body is a compelling interest that withstands strict 
scrutiny.139 The Court further held that when a university’s “proper 
institutional mission” is at issue, “‘good faith’ on the part of [the] 
university is ‘presumed’ absent ‘a showing to the contrary.’”140  
                                                 
133 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984). 
134 Id. at 626. 
135 Id. at 624. 
136 Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld, 291 F. 
Supp. 2d 269, 280 (D.N.J. 2003), rev’d, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004), rev’d and 
remanded, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006). 
137 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (Colorado constitutional 
amendment denied to homosexual individuals the sort of protections against 
exclusion from ordinary life in society that heterosexual individuals take for 
granted). 
138 Cf. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 469 (1973) (“discriminatory 
treatment exerts a pervasive influence on the entire educational process”). 
139 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003). 
140 Id. at 329 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318-19 
(1978)). 
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So long as SIU applied the EEO Policy in furtherance of its 
“institutional mission,” it is therefore presumed to have acted in good 
faith. The Supreme Court has noted that a university can further its 
educational mission by promoting participation in student groups and 
other extracurricular activities.141 SIU’s determination that its 
educational mission would be furthered by eliminating discrimination 
in access to student groups was thus entitled to substantial deference 
from the Seventh Circuit. Rather than granting SIU this deference 
however, the majority casually referred to the state’s general interest in 
eliminating discriminatory conduct, and then insisted, despite the 
limited record before it, that SIU had enforced the EEO Policy not to 
promote equality of opportunities, but rather to suppress CLS’s ability 
to express its beliefs.142 Precisely because the record was so limited, 
Judge Wood had no reason to believe that SIU would behave in such a 
capricious manner: “I am unwilling to indulge in the presumption that 
a body that is legally part of the State of Illinois is violating the federal 
and state constitutions.”143 
B. The Seventh Circuit should not have reversed the district court, 
because the record was too incomplete to rule on CLS’s public-
forum exclusion claim. 
 Even though the record on appeal was admittedly thin, Judge 
Sykes nonetheless held that SIU had violated CLS’s right to participate 
in the public forum of officially recognized student organizations.144 
Judge Wood noted in her dissent that SIU had not yet presented any 
evidence because of the case’s early procedural posture.145 It is 
therefore unsurprising that, in the majority’s words, “every part of [the 
record] . . . point[ed] to success for CLS.”146 The majority noted that 
                                                 
141 See Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 222-23 
(2000). 
142 Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 863 (2006). 
143 Id. at 874-75. 
144 Id. at 867. 
145 Id. at 869 (Wood, J. dissenting). 
146 Id. at 867. 
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SIU had created a some sort of public forum by choosing to grant 
official recognition to certain student groups,147 but acknowledged that 
the record was insufficiently developed to determine the exact type of 
public forum present, and therefore the proper level of scrutiny under 
which to analyze CLS’s alleged expulsion from the forum.148 The 
majority argued that, regardless of the level of scrutiny it applied, SIU 
had enforced the EEO Policy against CLS in a viewpoint 
discriminatory way.149 CLS alleged in its complaint that SIU had 
singled it out for derecognition,150 and provided the constitutions of a 
few other student groups which it claimed discriminated in their 
membership yet remained officially recognized.151 However, the 
district court noted that “at this stage in the case, the Court need not, 
and indeed cannot, decide whether the [EEO] Policy has been 
neutrally applied.”152 If the record was too incomplete for the district 
court to determine whether SIU had singled out CLS for enforcement 
of the EEO Policy, the majority was unwise to grant a preliminary 
injunction on the basis of that record. 
CONCLUSION 
In its expressive association jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has 
struck a balance between protecting the important First Amendment 
rights promoted by group association and protecting the rights of 
individuals to freely access publicly available goods and services. The 
Seventh Circuit’s holding in Christian Legal Society v. Walker tipped 
this delicate balance too far in favor of groups wishing to exclude, 
because Christian Legal Society’s associational rights were not 
significantly impaired in the same fashion as groups in prior 
expressive association cases. The Supreme Court’s present First 
                                                 
147 Id. at 865. 
148 Id. at 866. 
149 Id. 
150 Verified Complaint, supra note 102, at ¶ 4.11. 
151 Christian Legal Soc’y, 453 F.3d at 870 (Wood, J. dissenting). 
152 Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter at S. Ill. Univ. Sch. of Law v. Walker, No. 
05-4070-GPM, 2005 WL 1606448, at *2 n.2 (S.D. Ill Jul. 5, 2005). 
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Amendment jurisprudence allows colleges and universities, as part of 
their educational mission, to prevent discrimination within student 
organizations, so long as any antidiscrimination policy is enforced in a 
viewpoint-neutral manner. Because there was insufficient evidence 
before the Seventh Circuit that Southern Illinois University had 
discriminated in the application of its antidiscrimination policy to 
revoke Christian Legal Society’s status as an officially recognized 
student organization, the Seventh Circuit should not have reversed the 
district court’s decision. 
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